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The interactional achievement of speaker meaning:
Towards a formal account of conversational inference
Abstract
Dominant accounts of `speaker meaning' in post-Gricean contextualist pragmatics
tend to focus on single utterances, making the theoretical assumption that the
object of pragmatic analysis is restricted to cases where speakers and hearers
agree on utterance meanings, leaving instances of misunderstandings out of their
scope. However, we know that divergences in understandings between interlocutors
do often arise, and that when they do, speakers can engage in a local process of
meaning negotiation. In this paper, we take insights from interactional pragmatics
to offer an empirically informed view on `speaker meaning' that incorporates both
speakers' and hearers' perspectives, alongside a formalisation of how to model
speaker meanings in such a way that we can account for both understandings
 the canonical cases  and misunderstandings, but critically, also the process of
interactionally negotiating meanings between interlocutors. We thus highlight that
utterance-level theories of meaning provide only a partial representation of speaker
meaning as it is understood in interaction, and show that inferences about a given
utterance at any given time are formally connected to prior and future inferences
of all participants. Our proposed model thus provides a more fine-grained account
of how speakers converge on `speaker meanings' in real time, showing how such
meanings are often subject to a joint endeavour of complex inferential work.
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1
2meaning lies not with the speaker nor the addressee nor the utterance alone as many
philosophical arguments have considered, but rather with the interactional past,
current, and projected next moment. The meaning of an entire utterance is a complex,
not well understood, algorithm of these emergent, non-linear, sense-making
interactions (Schegloff et al. 1996: 181)
1 Introduction
Since Grice's (1957; 1975) seminal writings, the notion of `speaker meaning' has become
a familiar concept in formal pragmatics. It provides a level of theorisation that goes
beyond the literal content of what is said by individual utterances, comprising the
variety of implicit meanings that speakers communicate. However, what constitutes
speaker meaning is not uniformly agreed, and can vary depending on one's theoretical
commitments (Haugh & Jaszczolt 2012; Kecskes 2010). For example, a speaker-centric
view on meaning might take speaker meaning to refer to (i) the meaning (or range
of meanings) a speaker intends to communicate, while a hearer-oriented view might
consider speaker meaning as (ii) the meaning which the speaker is presumed to have
intended to communicate, or even (iii) the speaker is taken to have communicated,
regardless of whether he/she intended it.
In this paper we aim to combine these options in a way that can accommodate both
speaker and hearer perspectives on the meanings of individual utterances (cf. Kecskes
2010, 2017; Sanders 1987, 2015). This aim is motivated by the facts that speakers
and hearers sometimes need to negotiate meanings when divergences arise, and more-
over, that the process of negotiation is a typical occurrence in everyday communication
(see e.g. Bilmes 1986; Haugh 2008a; Kecskes 2008; Sanders 2015). This is partly due
to the fact that speaker meaning is not simply a theoretical construct grounded in
(a presumed) cognitive reality, but a deontological one with real-world consequences
for speakers (Haugh 2013; Sanders 1987). The stakes may vary, but speakers clearly
have a vested interest in being understood as they intend themselves to be understood
(Kecskes 2013).1 We thus take `speaker meaning' to be (iv) the meaning that is `inter-
actionally achieved' between participants (cf. Schegloff 1981), and our aim in this paper
is to propose a model of this speaker meaning in such a way that accounts for both
straightforward understandings  the canonical cases  and misunderstandings through
the process of interactionally negotiating meanings between interlocutors.2
1Indeed, the negotiation of speaker meaning even extends to `strategic misunderstandings' as Robles
(2017) has recently demonstrated.
2We acknowledge that meaning negotiation is traditionally associated with troubles in understand-
ing in L1-L2 interactions (see e.g. Long 1983; Varonis & Gass 1985), and has been extensively discussed
in applied linguistics (e.g. Pica 1994; Foster & Ohta 2005; Chiang 2009). However, in this paper we
are referring to meaning negotiation in the ethnomethodological sense (e.g. Garfinkel 1967; Heritage
3Taking the object of speaker meaning as that which is interactionally achieved runs
counter to dominant contextualist accounts of speaker meaning in philosophical prag-
matics (e.g. Recanati 2010; Sperber & Wilson 1995) that provide analyses of individual
utterances as they arise in conversation. On such views, speaker meaning is concep-
tualised as the output of a speaker's language processing system and as the input of
the language processing system of another person. While such views on meaning have
their place in pragmatic theory, our aim is to capture both speaker and hearer per-
spectives in a single notion of speaker meaning. As pointed out by Arundale (2008),
this necessarily involves accounting for non-summative meanings, in the sense that in-
ferences that interlocutors make about meanings are formally interdependent with the
responses of others. As such, our notion of speaker meaning is informed not only by the
speaker's inference about how he/she will be understood, but also the inference that
is made available by a hearer's response about how he/she has understood that prior
utterance, which in turn gives rise to further inferences of the speaker regarding the
meaning of his/her own utterance with respect to how it has been understood. This
takes us away from a view on speaker meaning that is informed solely by the utterance
as it arises in context, but towards what has been termed the three-part architecture
of conversational inference that underpins meaning (cf. Arundale 1999). So, against
dominant contextualist solutions in the post-Gricean literature, our model highlights
that utterance-level theories of meaning provide only a partial representation of speaker
meaning as it is understood in interaction, and in this sense, our view is closer in spirit
to theories of discourse structure, such as Question Under Discussion (e.g. Ginzburg
2012) and Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (Asher & Lascarides 2003).
Note that while the term `speaker meaning' can be used to incorporate a variety
of meanings, ranging from strong to weak and from explicit to implicit, in this paper
we do not attempt to model social inferences such as politeness effects, or weak impli-
catures (cf. Sperber & Wilson 2015). Rather, the meaning that we aim to model here
is the most salient propositional meaning that is ostensively made operative between
interlocutors. Note that, as will become clear, we depart from the standard Gricean dis-
tinction between `what is said' and `what is meant', and instead take a view on speaker
meaning that is more closely related to Jaszczolt's (2005; 2016) `primary meaning' 
namely, the main `intended' meaning of a speaker which is successfully recovered by a
hearer  or Ariel's (2002) `privileged interactional interpretation', the speaker's most
relevant contribution to the discourse.3 However, while these semantic contextualist so-
1984), that is, the interactional processes by which participants (actively) shape or `interactionally
achieve' what speakers are accountably taken to mean in both L1-L2 (e.g. Kecskes et al. 2018) and
L1-L1 interactions (e.g. Sanders 2017) through their responses to prior utterances.
3As Haugh & Jaszczolt (2012) point out, intention can be understood and used in multiple different
ways in modelling speaker meaning. In the subsequent discussion, we are referring to `intention' in its
ordinary, discursive sense as what speakers and hearers are licensed to infer as the main `intended'
4lutions have gone some way towards offering a semantics of natural language utterances
that converges with cognitive reality, what our model adds to these extant proposals
of propositional meaning is a more fine-grained account of how speakers converge on
the most salient proposition in real time that allows for divergences in understanding
between interlocutors.
To exemplify the model, we focus on the phenomenon of hinting, specifically, re-
questive hints. Requestive hinting encompasses a particular pragmatic move in which
a speaker communicates an `off-record indirect request' (Brown & Levinson 1987) such
that the hearer is expected to figure out the speaker's intention, and so squarely fall
under Jary's (2013) category of `behavioural implicatures'.4 Typical analyses of hinting
tend to focus on a single utterance that contains the hint (e.g. `this soup's a bit bland',
`it's a bit cold in here') where the intended meaning is relatively determinate and the
implicature is readily available. However, requestive hints are not always so straight-
forwardly recoverable, and can vary in their `propositional opacity' (Blum-Kulka &
Olshtain 1984; Weizman 1985). Exactly because requestive hints are formulated in such
a way that the content of the request is not overtly attended to, the speaker's com-
municative intention is presented as deliberately ambiguous and the speaker retains
plausible deniability that he/she actually requested anything. Due to this ambiguity or
even absence of an intention to request, a single-utterance analysis is likely to run into
trouble when determining the `meaning' of the hinting utterance (Ogiermann 2015).
Examining instances of `hinting' thus provide a fruitful testing ground for teasing out
the propositions at play in such interactions.
In this paper, we first provide an overview of the literature on requestive hints,
exemplifying the restrictions of a single-utterance account of speaker meaning with re-
spect to how they are understood. In Section 3, we move to propose a formal model
of the process of negotiating propositional meanings as non-summative interactional
achievements, before showing, in Section 4, how the model can be applied to interac-
tional data where offers are (more, or less, straightforwardly) prompted by what are
taken to be hints. Specifically, we apply the model to a relatively simple case of nego-
tiating meanings through the three-part architecture, to a more complex example that
meaning of a speaker. In that sense, we are sympathetic to the Relevance Theoretic position that
propositional meaning is ultimately determined by the hearer's uptake (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1995).
Claims about the actual intentions of speakers or inferences about those intentions necessarily require
different methodological warrants, but these go beyond the scope of the theoretical claims in this paper.
We would simply note here that to locate speaker meaning in the inferences of the hearer, alongside
those of the speaker, is to commit to a public notion of speaker meaning (Sanders 2013, 2015) involving
a set of available inferences to which the speaker is publicly committed through what he/she says (and
doesn't say) at that point in time.
4Notably, hints are regarded by Searle (1979: ix) as falling outside of the formal purview of speech
act theory, but do fall within Grice's (1975) theory of conversational implicature, although they were
only addressed in passing (see Grice 1987: 368).
5requires more than three turns to settle on the operative meaning, and a case in which
meanings can be left more or less indeterminate between interlocutors. We conclude in
Section 5, acknowledging that the three-part process of conversational inference can, of
course, be short-circuited, and that two turns is very often sufficient for speakers and
hearers to presume mutual understanding of attested speaker meaning. We thus provide
some reconciliation between our proposal and extant accounts of `speaker meaning' by
situating single-utterance analyses of meaning within this three-part architecture.
2 The propositional meaning of hints
Following Brown & Levinson (1987), an `off-record' speech act is one that uses indirect
language, that is, where the speaker means something through saying something else
(Bach 2006; Davis 1998), thereby decreasing the potential for the speaker to be seen as
imposing on the hearer. On a standard Gricean view of the division of labour between
semantics and pragmatics, the explicitly uttered sentence is taken as the input to se-
mantic  propositional  content, while the implicitly communicated off-record content
pertains to the realm of pragmatics as a speaker-intended implicature (Grice 1975). On
this view, speaker meaning is a purely pragmatic concern that lies outside the scope
of semantic theory. However, against this Gricean, `minimalist' conception of semantics
is the post-Gricean view of semantic `contextualism', which aims at delivering a view
on `what is said' that aligns with what the interlocutors themselves agree has been
`said', thus extending the degree to which pragmatic inferencing is allowed to intrude
on semantic, propositional content.
Phenomena such as reference assignment, conceptual transfer, and so forth, has pro-
vided motivation for appealing to speakers' intentions to enrich the logical form of ut-
tered sentences, in essence moving the study of propositional meaning away from form-
based accounts and towards the study of a more intuition-motivated `truth-conditional
pragmatics' (e.g. Recanati 2010). On such a view, the propositional content will often
be an enriched or modulated logical form, so that the sentence simply provides the
input on which pragmatic processing can operate. However, as extensively noted by
Jaszczolt (e.g. 2005; 2016), sometimes the strongest and most reliable way to commu-
nicate thoughts is by using indirect language. On this view, the primary meaning that
is intended by a speaker is the one that is of most use to interlocutors, even if it drasti-
cally departs from the logical form of the utterance. So, despite the fact that off-record
speech acts typically require hearers to make recourse to pragmatic inferencing to figure
out the speaker's intended meaning, as long as the hearer can successfully recover that
meaning, the implicitly communicated, indirect meaning can take on the status of the
most salient propositional meaning that is available to both speaker and hearer.
The following exchange exemplifies that the speaker's main message may pertain
6to an implicitly communicated message, and that the explicit content need never be
attended to, or at least can remain backgrounded.
(1) (Chad is standing in the hallway, holding his 15-month old son's hand.)
1 C: Hey, Debbie.
2 Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
3 D: Yeah. I think so.
4 You want me to watch him?
5 C: Yeah.
6 D: I'd love to. It'd be a pleasure.
7 C: Okay. Thanks. I'll bring him around then.
(Jacobs & Jackson 1983: 299)
In line 2, Chad asks Debbie whether she is going to be free at a specific time later
that afternoon. The standard Gricean analysis of the speaker meaning of this utterance
would be that the literal, semantic content pertains to a question  which is answered
by Debbie in line 3  but that the intended implicated (pragmatic) meaning can be
calculated by considering the relevance of the question to the interaction. In this sense,
Chad's question can be viewed as an off-record request for Debbie to watch his son,
without directly having to ask. An analysis of a more contextualist flavour would go
a step further to argue that in order to view Chad's question as an off-record request
with a specific goal in mind, the question itself requires enriching so as to address the
question `free for what?' (cf. Bach 1994). It may well be the case that Debbie is willing
to make herself free to watch Chad's son, but may respond differently if the supposed
motivation for the question is for some other purpose, for instance, proposing that
they have a meeting about a joint research paper at that time.5 That is, it is through
considering the reason for Chad's question, and hence modulating the inherently vague
word `free', that Debbie can devise her response. On this view, a successful interaction
is dependent on Debbie reconstructing an enriched logical form, and it is that enriched
meaning that would take on the status of semantic, propositional content.
There are arguments either way for whether semantics should be more concerned
with the study of explicitly or implicitly communicated thoughts. We opt out of this
debate by instead proposing a third option which we find the most intuitively plausible,
but also the most empirically sound. Rather than hypothesising about speakers' private,
cognitive inferences, we aim to represent speakers' `primary meanings' that are made
available through their on-record inferences. That is, rather than taking a strict semantic
5Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
7view and representing the `literal' content of the words uttered, or a pragmatic view
that hypothesises about speaker's intended meanings, we aim to represent the primary
meanings that the interlocutors themselves interactionally achieve in the process of
communication. A strong motivation for such a view is that, for example in (1), it
is difficult to state with complete certainty the extent to which Chad had an a priori
intention to ask for assistance in line 2, and hence to attribute to Chad such an intention
is potentially cognitively inaccurate. Rather, we are concerned with the meanings that
speakers jointly converge on: the inquiry by Chad in line 2 prompts the offer of assistance
from Debbie in line 4, which is readily accepted by Chad in line 5 (Haugh 2017b: 198).
Note that in straightforwardly accepting Debbie's offer, Chad does license the inference
that he may well have had such an intention at the time of his initial utterance. However,
it also has to be noted that this intention remains off-record up until that point. In short,
it is not clear that Chad's utterance in line 2 can be taken as meaning that he wants
Debbie to look after his son in his asking whether Debbie is free at that time, although
it is clearly inferable.
The potential equivocality of speaker intentions underlying questions that subse-
quently prompt offers can be seen more clearly in the following example.
(2) (Sirl and Michael, who is staying at Sirl's place, have both stopped outside the
bathroom at the same time.)
1 S: What time are you leaving this morning?
2 M: Oh, in about an hour I suppose.
3 Are you in a hurry to leave?
4 S: No, no. Just asking.
5 (2.0)
6 M: Would you like to use the bathroom first?
7 S: Yeah, sure, if you don't mind.
(Haugh 2007: 94)
In asking whether Sirl is `in a hurry' in line 3, Michael appears to have inferred from
Sirl's question in line 1 that Sirl would like to use the bathroom first. Despite the fact
that Sirl denies having any such intention in line 4, he subsequently does not move
and continues to stand outside the bathroom door. Michael then redoes his response
to Sirl's initial question in line 6 by making an offer, which Sirl then accepts. In this
example we can see Sirl actively working to avoid the inference that, in asking what
time Michael is leaving in line 1, he intends to communicate that he wants Michael to
let him use the bathroom first. But the point is not that Michael misunderstands Sirl's
intended meaning, but that Sirl responds in such a way as to avoid being accountable for
8making a request in the first place. This is possible because it remains equivocal in such
cases whether a proposition that the speaker would like the hearer to do something
for him/her can be attributed to these sorts of `preliminary' questions (i.e. that are
inferable as addressing felicity conditions for a request) with any certainty.
Analyses of hints in the literature on implicature have tended to overlook the cru-
cial second and third turns which provide insights into how hints are attended to by
participants. Specifically, in cases where a hint by speaker A does prompt an offer from
speaker B, the way in which A responds to the offer in the third turn indicates whether
A wishes to license the inference that this was indeed what he/she intended. In fact,
Haugh (2017b) suggests that the raison d'être of hinting is that the third turn gives
A an `out': A is unlikely to straightforwardly accept such an offer from B, as doing
so would likely expose A's intentions too clearly in a way that is socially dispreferred;
instead, A will frequently hedge their acceptance, provide accounts for accepting, or
even initially reject the offer in order to retain some degree of plausible deniability with
respect to having had any such a priori intention.
The way in which not straightforwardly accepting an offer resists the inference that
the speaker was hinting in the first place is apparent in the following example.6
(3) (Emma has been talking about needing to go out and buy some food as she
doesn't have anything for dinner)
1 E: I had a little tiny bit-
2 piece a fish so I don't know I may have to go to the
3 store but you go ahead Gladys and phone it up
4 I think maybe
5 G: they'll send it down
6 E: ye[ah
7 G: [can I add anything for you?
8 E: Oh honey thanks I think I'll ah let Guy go
9 G: [Yes
10 E: [Maybe get some fish.
11 G: Okay.
(Haugh 2017b: 195)
In this case, Emma initially refuses, in line 8, the offer from Gladys (line 7) following
Emma's `thinking aloud', in lines 2-3, that she'll need to go up to the shops (notably,
Gladys is aware from previous conversations that Emma doesn't like to drive). However,
6For the sake of expediency, the original transcription of this interaction has been simplified, al-
though the use of square brackets has been retained here to indicate overlapping talk. See (Haugh
2017a: 195) for a more detailed transcription and analysis of this example.
9Emma subsquently accepts the offer, albeit in a hedged manner (line 10). In this way,
Emma resists the inference that she intended Gladys to make such an offer as a result
of her previous talk, despite it being inferable. Relying on utterance-based analyses of
hints is evidently not enough if we are to tap into the processes by which the meanings
of such hints are negotiated.
These kinds of examples also flesh out, at least in part, Sperber and Wilson's (2015)
broader argument that there are a range of speaker meanings that a hearer can pick
up on from a given utterance. That is, their observation that one utterance (or act of
communication) expresses an array of propositions  which range in how determinately
the content can be uniquely paraphrased into a natural language sentence and the extent
to which the speaker can be held to be committed to that proposition  underpins their
claim that an adequate theory of communication has to go beyond Grice's notion of
speaker meaning. In the remainder of this paper, we attempt to extend this broader
aim by pursuing a formal generalisation of the process of negotiation between speaker
and hearer in attaining speaker meaning(s) that arise through `saying' in conversation.
Our aim is not only to show that the meanings of hints are typically negotiated between
interlocutors, but also what that process involves and how it occurs.
3 Towards a formalisation of the three-part architecture of conversational
inference
Since Grice, there has been a growing debate on what constitutes `what is said' vis-
à-vis `what is implicated' via individual utterances. However, rather than assuming a
one-stage process of `speaker implicates, hearer infers' (Horn 2004) of single utterances,
or even a two-stage process commonly referenced in conversation analytic studies of
`adjacency pairs' (Schegloff & Sacks 1973), we aim to show that propositions are often
subject to a three-part process in which the previous `one-stage' process is only the first
part. A second part occurs when a hearer responds to a speaker's utterance (u1) with an
utterance of their own (u2), thereby making publicly available his/her inference about
the speaker's previous utterance, u1. Then, a third part occurs by the speaker further
responding to the hearer's u2 with another utterance u3, in which the speaker confirms
or disconfirms the hearer's (displayed) inference as appropriate.
The process of negotiating meanings in this incremental, sequentially-grounded way
has been termed the process of `interactional achievement' (Sacks et al. 1974; Schegloff
1981). In this section we propose a model of interactional achievement in which speaker
meaning is formally defined in terms of the process of negotiating meanings between
interlocutors.7 In order to postulate a formal model of the conversational inferences
7Arundale (forthcoming) makes a distinction between two-part interactional achievement (or what
he terms autonomous co-constituting) and three-part conjoint co-constituting in his conjoint co-
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that underpin the interactional achievement of `speaker meaning', we draw on the be-
ginnings of a formal model of conversational inferencing found in Arundale (2013) on
`conceptualising interaction' in which he distinguishes between `provisional' and `oper-
ative' inferences. Arundale's proposal draws, in turn, from Krippendorff (1970), who
initially modelled this kind of interaction effect in more formal terms with respect to
different types of communication data. The notion of `speaker meaning' we are focusing
on here is thus a deontological one, that is, the propositional meanings of utterances in
the first turn to which speakers are held accountable through the responses of hearers
in the second turn, and held reflexively accountable through responding themselves in
the third turn (to the hearer's response in the second turn to their initial utterance in
the first turn) (Haugh 2013: 47).
Indeed, as Sperber & Wilson (1995) argue at length, linguistic action confers on
speakers a particular form of commitment. By saying things to others we are invari-
ably held to be meaning something  although not necessarily what we've just said 
even if we claim to be only talking to ourselves. The level of determinacy that those
propositional meanings have and the degree to which speakers are committed to them
will vary depending on the specifics of the linguistic action and the mutually manifest
context in which it occurs. In short, linguistic action makes available inferences about
what the speaker means, and because linguistic acts are public, the inferences they
make available through their utterances are also public in the sense that speakers will
be held committed to what a linguistic act in a given sequential context is normatively
taken to mean (Jary 2013; Sanders 2015). Our contention is that a key mechanism by
which the primary propositional meanings that arise through utterances is settled upon
by speakers and hearers is through subsequent responses to prior utterances.8 In what
follows, we focus on the simpler case of two-person interaction, although the model is
extendable to more complex multi-party interactions.9
An early attempt to clarify the three-part architecture of conversational inference
that underpins speaker meaning was outlined by Haugh (2012: 186-188, 2015: 234-
236) drawing, in turn, on Arundale's (2008; 2010) conjoint co-constituting model of
communication. The three parts (which canonically, but not always, occur in adjacent
constituting model of communication. Given our focus is more specifically on conversational inference
only, we cannot do justice to the intricacies of that distinction here, and so we are using the term
interactional achievement in the broad sense initially outlined by Schegloff (1981: 73).
8Readers will note that we are not offering a formal account of propositional meaning here. This
is deliberate as we intend the interactional model outlined in this section to be amenable to different
theoretical accounts of propositional meaning, and so remain agnostic as to which model of `utterance
meaning' might be employed in subsequent theorisation.
9At this point, it should become immediately clear that continuing to refer to `speakers' and `hearers'
will quickly get confusing as the process of negotiating propositional meaning involves more than one
speaker; to avoid such complications we avoid referring to `hearers' at all, instead making reference to
speakers A and B respectively.
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turns) go as follows:
1. A produces an utterance u1, making available an inference about how they expect
u1 to be understood;
2. B responds with u2, making available an inference about how they think A ex-
pected u1 to be understood;
3. A responds to B by way of u3, making available an inference about how they think
B has understood how A expected u1 to be understood.
Through this three-part process, the inferences that A and B make available with regard
to a particular utterance u1 become formally tied to one another: both A and B's
inferences about u1 become interdependent with the inferences that are made available
by the other participant in the discourse, and the derivation of meaning is not simply
an independent process based on the utterance alone. In other words, when we speak,
we draw inferences about what is meant by ourselves and others, but these inferences
are driven in part by our interlocutors' inferences about what we mean and vice-versa.
Krippendorff (1970) formally distinguishes (i) an inference at time t, (ii) whose
inference is being made (A or B), and (iii) what the inference is directed towards (u). On
this model, the inference at t2 is dependent on the inference at t1. While Krippendorff
used this notation to describe different types of data, we use it as a base on which
to develop an account that both uses the type of interactional data he advocates, and
advance this formalisation to model speaker meaning. Using Krippendorff's terminology,
then, we can formally distinguish inferences at time t1 and inferences at time t2. A key
argument of this paper is to show that these are not straightforwardly the same thing.
Acknowledging these three variables (utterance u, time t, and whose inference, A or
B) gives us the potential power to represent the meaning of any utterance at any point
in time and as understood by any speaker. Doing so will highlight when discrepancies
in presumed meanings arise between individual speakers. However, what is needed is a
way of identifying the formal dependency between the inferences made by individual
speakers on the meanings of specific utterances. To this end, we take our anchor to be
the meaning of a given utterance u1 which occurs at time t1 (i.e. the time of utterance),
such that all inferences in the model are with regard to this anchor.
We are now in a position to describe our model. Assuming a two-person interaction,
we let A be speaker A's inference with regard to u1, and B be speaker B's inference with
regard to u1. When A produces an utterance u1 at t1, A makes available an inference
about the way in which A expects u1 to be understood, and this inference is made
publicly available by way of the content of the utterance in that sequential context.
We call this APb(t1). It is on the basis of this publicly available inference that B is able
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to make a private inference at t1 about what A intended to communicate, which we
denote BPv(t1). So at t1 we have two sets of inferences: the public inference about what
is meant through u1 at t1 that is made available by speaker A through uttering u1, and
the private inference that we (as analysts) presume speaker B makes on the basis of A
uttering u1 at t1.
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
While Horn (2004) distinguishes `implicatures'  meanings that are speaker intended
 and `inferences' that are hearer interpretations, we do not make such a distinction
and use the term `inference' throughout to highlight the idea that we are tracing the
(presumed) private inferences that people make on the basis of the inferences that they
make publicly available via their utterances.
In recognition of the fact that speakers do have (private) beliefs about the way in
which they expect to be understood by their utterances, we add a previous layer into
the model which we describe as the speaker's private inference regarding the meaning
of u1, denoted APv(t0).
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APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
u1
It is this private inference that can feasibly be equated with a notion of intended
content. But as we cannot get into the heads of speakers this information is for repre-
sentational purposes only.11 Rather, the public inference that A makes available does
exactly that: makes available an inference (or set of inferences) about how A expects
to be understood.
By the same token, note that neither A nor the analyst are privy to the inference
BPv(t1) that B privately makes about A's utterance u1. The analyst can only make
assumptions about what this inference is on the basis of the inference that B makes
available via their reply in u2. So, given B's presumed inference at t1, that is, BPv(t1), B
10Note that we do not make any claims about the speaker's cognitive processing regarding this
private inference: one can think of it as constituting the speaker's a priori intended meaning, or as a
post-hoc inference about his/her own utterance, depending on one's view on utterance processing.
11Regardless of whether speakers are able to engage in a process of mind reading when gauging
another speaker's intended meaning, it has been suggested that one's own dominant perspective is
more likely to influence interpretations of what others say (Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011; Keysar 2007),
further justifying an analysis that focuses on speakers' public inferences.
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produces an utterance u2 at t2 in response, which makes available an inference about
how B understood A's initial utterance, u1. The inference that B makes available is
denoted BPb(t2).
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
BPb(t2)
u1
u2
B's utterance not only makes available an inference about how they expect u2 to be
understood by A, but, crucially, it also makes available an inference about how B has
understood A's utterance, u1. And note that it is only via this inference that B makes
available at t2 that both the analyst and speaker A can make retrospective assumptions
about B's presumed (private) inference at t1 regarding u1.
Now, once B's inference is made available about u1, it becomes available to A
whether u1 has been understood in the way that A initially expected, and A can make a
private inference about how the meaning of u1 is being operationalized, denoted APv(t2).
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
APv(t2) BPb(t2)
u1
u2
A's private inference at t2 about how B has understood u1 may or may not align with
A's previous (private) inference at t0 about how he/she expected u1 to be understood.
The third turn in the sequence thus provides an opportunity for A to do one of three
things: to (i) repair the mismatch if there is one, (ii) corroborate that B has satisfactorily
understood u1 (either explicitly (e.g. `yes', `that's right'), or implicitly by continuing the
discourse), or (iii) update their own belief on how u1 has been understood by accepting
the response by B and responding accordingly.
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The inference that A privately makes at t2 about the level of convergence between
A and B regarding u1 influences the strategy that A chooses to employ. A's response
u3 thus makes available an inference to B at t3 about the way A believes B to have
understood u1, APb(t3), which then leads B to make a private inference at t3 about A's
initial utterance u1 at t1, BPv(t3).
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
APv(t2) BPb(t2)
APb(t3) BPv(t3)
u1
u2
u3
Note that it is possible to conjecture that the inference that A makes available at t3 via
u3 not only concerns how B understood u1 at t2, i.e. the previous turn, but arguably
also tells us something about A's initial expectation about how A would be understood
at t1. Indeed critically, as analysts, it is only at t3 that we can make claims about A's
presumed inference at t0 about how u1 would be understood by B. However, we want to
avoid making claims about A's intention at t0 on the basis of A's displayed inference at
t3. This is because, in line with A's option (iii) above, A can update their belief about
the meaning of u1 based on B's response at t2. There are various reasons a speaker may
do this: for example, because B's response was in line with the plausible interpretations
A could have communicated, or because A finds it too trivial or embarrassing to correct,
or a combination of the two.
In order to circumvent the idea that we are making such claims, we avoid the term
`emergent intention' (e.g. Kecskes 2010), as it is not A's intention that becomes clear
over time, but rather what he/she can legitimately be taken to be meaning. A more
accurate way to think about it is thus that people have intentions that can change over
time; that is, the object at which inferences are taken to be directed, or intentionality
more broadly, is dynamic (Haugh 2008b; Haugh & Jaszczolt 2012). That is, whatever
A's initial intention at t0, B's response at t2 can lead A to update/revise the meaning
they ascribe to u1. So rather than referring to `emergent intentions', we can talk of
`emergent meanings', where meanings are updated as time goes on.
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Whatever meaning is made `operative' at tn, where n is the time of some future turn
in the interaction, the representation of that meaning has to be specified in relation to
the process of meaning interaction from time t1, insofar as the meanings of u1 that
emerge over the interaction are formally connected to future inferences that are made
about u1. The model thus distinguishes those inferences which are tied to a particular
utterance u at time t1, and those inferences which are tied to u at time tn. If we want to
represent propositional meanings, we have to do so with respect to particular times, as
those meanings become cognitively available to participants. And note that in picking
out the propositional meaning at a specific time, we are picking out an inference of a
particular speaker (e.g. A or B) at that time, which may or may not converge with those
of the other participants. In sum, inferences about u at any given time t are formally
connected to prior (t−m) and future (tn) inferences in the sense that future inferences
are dependent on past inferences, and they are all interlinked.
Finally, speakers make inferences about individual utterances u at t1, t2, t3, ... , tn
until they converge on a meaning that is sufficient for the purposes of the discourse.
Note that at some point, speakers will not be worrying about the meanings of prior
utterances as it becomes too cognitively demanding to maintain the process as new
turns occur, unless there is a catastrophic miscommunication which is later called on
as the source of trouble. To this end, we leave the exact value of n open as a matter
for psycholinguistics to determine at what point it becomes cognitively implausible to
coordinate on past meanings, although based on empirical evidence we can conjecture
that n typically lies between 3 and 5 as the number of turns for which it is plausible
that the meaning of a `hint' becomes `determinate enough' that it is adequate for the
purposes at hand.
4 Putting the model to work
With the model in place, we are now in a position to exemplify in greater detail how it
can be applied to interactional data, highlighting how the meanings of critical utterances
emerge over time. We begin with a relatively simple example in which a requestive hint
is quickly recognised and confirmed. We then move to more complex examples, including
a case where the third turn highlights problems with settling on what the speaker meant
by their prior utterance, and finally an attempt to show how the model can handle cases
of indeterminate meanings.
4.1 A simple example of speaker meaning as interactional achievement
First, let us recall the example discussed in Section 2.
(1) (Chad is standing in the hallway, holding his 15-month old son's hand.)
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1 C: Hey, Debbie.
2 Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
3 D: Yeah. I think so.
4 You want me to watch him?
5 C: Yeah.
6 D: I'd love to. It'd be a pleasure.
7 C: Okay. Thanks. I'll bring him around then.
(Jacobs & Jackson 1983: 299)
Note that we can apply the model to any utterance to track the meanings over time,
but for the sake of exemplification, the crucial utterance that we take as our anchor
for this example is Chad's utterance at line 2, `Are you going to be free from 1:30 to
2:30?'. This is the utterance that we take as u1 at time t1. Through u1, Chad makes
available his inference about the way he expects u1 to be understood by Debbie, giving
us CPb(t1). There are a number of options that can be inferred regarding the content of
CPb(t1), including:
CPb(t1)a: Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
CPb(t1)b: Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30 to watch my son?
CPb(t1)c: Can you watch my son from 1:30 to 2:30?
Any of these is a plausible candidate that might take on the role of the primary speaker
meaning of u1.
12 But rather than speculate over Chad's intended meaning at this point,
and in fact regardless of Chad's actual (private) intention at t0 regarding how u1 should
be understood, the meaning that we are concerned with is the one that is made operative
between these conversational participants.
To this end, we turn to Debbie's inference about u1. Following Chad's uttering of
u1, Debbie is able to make her own (private) inference DPv(t1) about Chad's putative
meaning. As a reminder, we only make assumptions about Debbie's private inference
about u1 on the basis of Debbie's public utterance u2 at t2. We see that her initial
response, `Yeah. I think so', attends to the explicit content of Chad's question, making
available a public inference about how she has interpreted u1, landing us with a working
`speaker meaning' of u1 as pertaining to the literal content of the question, namely:
DPb(t2)a: Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
12There are, of course, a range of other possible inferences, as we briefly noted in Section 2. For the
sake of expediency, however, we focus on just these three.
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However, Debbie's immediate follow up, `You want me to watch him?', makes available
her inference that Chad's utterance u1 may have communicated an implicit request,
namely to watch his son. Thus, Debbie makes available her inference that Chad's speaker
meaning may have pertained to the enriched version of the explicit question (i.e. the
explicature in Relevance Theoretic terms), or even the request itself (i.e. the implica-
ture):
DPb(t2)b: Are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30 to watch my son?
DPb(t2)c: Can you watch my son from 1:30 to 2:30?
Following Debbie making available her inference about the way that she understood
u1, namely as a request to watch Chad's son, at t3, Chad accepts Debbie's overt invi-
tation in u3 with `Yeah'. It is through this third turn that Chad makes available his
inference that he does, in fact, want Debbie to watch his son, and hence that Debbie's
inference regarding u1 is compatible with Chad's overall communicative goal (cf. El-
der forthcoming). So, Chad's affirmative response plays a dual role: first, of accepting
Debbie's offer in u2, but also of confirming that Debbie's inference at t2 regarding what
Chad meant by uttering u1 was appropriate. It is only now, following Chad's u3, that
it is reasonable to postulate that both speakers have jointly converged on the speaker
meaning of u1 as:
CPb(t3)c: Can you watch my son from 1:30 to 2:30?
Notably, this latter inference arising in the third turn is formally interdependent with
the inferences that were made available through the utterances in the prior two turns.
In short, Chad confirming the inference that he wants Debbie to watch his son (CPb(t3))
through u3 depends on Debbie making available the inference that Chad wants Debbie
to watch his son (DPb(t2)c) through u2, which depends, in turn, on Chad initially making
available the inference that he wants Debbie to watch his son (CPb(t1)c) through u1. This
can be formally represented as follows:
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CPv(t0)
CPb(t1) DPv(t1)
CPv(t2) DPb(t2)
CPb(t3) DPv(t3)
u1: are you going to be free from 1:30 to 2:30?
u2: you want me to watch him?
u3: yeah.
It is also important to note that even though the interlocutors converged on this
meaning of u1, we still refrain from making claims about Chad's a priori, pre-utterance
intention at t0 to make a request. Regardless of whether Chad intended to communicate
a request at u1, it is only through the uptake that is made available at t2 and t3 that we
can say with any certainty that this implicit meaning was made operative between the
two interlocutors, that is, that Chad was taken by both Debbie and himself as implying
(or implicating) that he would like Debbie to watch his son. In other words, while it is
plausible that u1 communicated an implicature of a request, it is by attending to this
fundamental three-part architecture of conversational inference that we can see how
this aspect of `speaker meaning' is interactionally achieved in communication, and thus
that `speaker meaning' in such cases depends on making available successive inferences
that are formally interdependent with one another.
4.2 Speaker meaning beyond three turns
While participants often readily converge on `speaker meaning' in the manner described
above, in some instances such meanings may be worked out over a number of turns that
go beyond this basic three-part architecture. While such cases are traditionally treated
as instances of `miscommunication' in need of repair by the participants and so are
held to lie outside the purview of a theoretical account of `speaker meaning', closer
examination of such cases indicates that the negotiation of `speaker meaning' may arise
for a number of reasons that go beyond either straightforward `misunderstandings' of
the speaker's putative intentions, or processing errors on the part of one or both of the
participants, as we briefly noted in examining cases of hinting in Section 2.
For a start, although it may sound somewhat oxymoronic, speakers do not necessar-
ily always have determinate intentions in mind when they speak, at least, regarding the
precise propositional content that they are communicating. They may speak in ways
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that leave room for the other speaker to determine what they are taken to mean (Elder
forthcoming; Jaszczolt et al. 2016). Speakers may also be opportunistic with respect to
what they are taken to be meaning, responding to local contingencies (Haugh 2007),
or they may even change their minds, allowing what the other speaker understands
them to have meant to stand as it turns out to suit them (Clark 1997). They may also
subsequently dispute what they are taken to mean when they are understood in a way
that turns out to have significant negative (real-world) consequences for them (Haugh
2008a). For our purposes, we contend that such instances have significant theoretical
import as they attest to the way in which participants draw from the three-part ar-
chitecture of conversational inference despite this negotiation occurring over successive
turns.
In the following example, for instance, we can trace the way in which the meaning
of an utterance is subject to subtle negotiation by the two participants. Mike (MH), a
researcher, is visiting Mary (MP), his old music teacher.
(4) (Mary has offered Mike some biscuits and both have started eating them)
1 MP: ((while eating)) oh.
2 MH: [mm
3 MP: [I haven't gotta y'a bread `n butter plate
4 but there's one in the cupboard if you want one.
5 MH: mm, oh should be okay.
6 I'll j[u-
7 MP: [yo[u alright?
8 MH: [d'ya d'ya
9 do you want one?
10 MP: um yea- well it's le- less messier actually.
11 MH: okay.
12 MP: um, on the bottom shelf,
13 MH: mhm.
14 MP: just above the stove.
(Haugh 2015: 192)13
As we noted before, we can apply the model to any utterance in a given example, but
the critical utterance that we take as our anchor for analysis here is Mary's utterance
in lines 3-4, `I haven't got you a bread and butter plate but there's one in the cupboard
if you want one'. This is the utterance that we take as u1 at time t1.
13For the sake of expediency, the original transcription has been simplified, apart from the represen-
tation of overlapping talk, indicated by square brackets, and cut-off words, indicated by dashes. See
Haugh (2015: 191-197) for a more detailed transcription and analysis of this example.
20
Through u1, Mary makes available her inference about the way she expects u1 to be
understood by Mike, giving us MPPb(t1). However, there are a number of options that
can be inferred regarding the content of MPPb(t1), as while Mary makes available an
inference at t1, which at first glance appears to be a conditional offer with Mike as the
beneficiary, it could also be understood as a (polite) request with Mary or Mike as the
beneficiary, or even a request with both Mary and Mike as beneficiaries:
MPPb(t1)a: You can get a bread and butter plate from the cupboard if you want one
MPPb(t1)b: I want you to get a bread and butter plate from the cupboard for you
MPPb(t1)c: I want you to get a bread and butter plate from the cupboard for me
MPPb(t1)d: I want you to get a bread and butter plate for both of us
As in the previous example, any of these is a plausible candidate that might take
on the role of the primary speaker meaning of u1. But rather than speculate over
Mary's intended meaning at this point, and in fact regardless of Mary's actual intention
regarding how u1 should be understood, the meaning that we are concerned with is
the one that these conversational participants ultimately settle upon in the fifth turn,
namely, that Mary is asking Mike to go and get bread and butter plates for them both
(MPPb(t5)d). Notably, settling on this inference as what u1 comes to mean takes more
than three turns. In order to account for why this happens we must first trace the
inferences leading up to those made available through Mary's utterance in the third
turn, and then what subsequently follows.
Starting with Mary's u1 at time t1 in lines 3-4 we can presume that Mike makes some
kind of inference (MH Pv(t1)) about what Mary means on the basis of that utterance.
Through his response u2 at t2 in lines 5-6 he makes available the inference that he is
refusing her offer, which is predicated on the inference that through her prior utterance
she was making an offer to him (MH Pb(t2)a). Mary then presumably makes an inference
on the basis of Mike's response (MPPv(t2)), the exact content of which is unknowable to
us. However, the public inference she makes available through her subsequent response
in line 7, u3 at t3, is that she was not necessarily simply making an offer with Mike
as the beneficiary (MPPb(t3)¬a). This inference is made available partly through the
content of Mary's utterance itself, as asking `you alright?' presupposes that Mike may
be experiencing some kind of trouble, and partly because it is evidently interruptive
of Mike's just prior response, u2 at t2, as we can see from the overlapping talk at this
point, and Mike's consequent abandonment of whatever he was going to go on to say
in line 6.
Our contention is that in Mary's making available the inference that Mike's re-
sponse u2 to her initial utterance u1 was in some respects inapposite, that is, by Mary
not straightforwardly confirming that what she meant by u1 was that she was mak-
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ing an offer with Mike as the beneficiary, she launches a second round of three-part
conversational inferencing within which the prior three interlinked inferences are em-
bedded. In other words, Mary's question in line 7 (u3 at t3) is Janus-faced (Arundale
& Good 2002) as it both retrospectively disconfirms Mike's inference that Mary was
making a straightforward offer with Mike as the beneficiary (i.e. MPPb(t3)¬a) but also
prospectively prompts Mike to draw a different inference with respect to the getting of
plates, and thus to what she meant by u1. The public inference that is made available
through u3 at t3 can thus be simultaneously represented in this model asMPPb(t3)¬a and
MPPb(t3)b∧c∧d, where the latter representation denotes the remaining inferences that are
available to Mike.
However, if we continue to treat Mary's utterance in lines 3-4 as our anchor (i.e. u1)
 an analytical move that is arguably warranted given the orientation of the participants
themselves to the issue of getting plates as not having been settled at this point  then
we can see that Mike's subsequent response in lines 8-9 (u4 at t4), which is initially
delivered in overlap and thus is interruptive of Mary's just prior question in line 7 (u3
at t3), makes available the inference that Mike is making an offer with Mary as the
beneficiary, thereby retrospectively treating, and thus making available, the inference
that Mary is implicating a request with Mary as the beneficiary (MH Pb(t4)c), as opposed
to a request with Mike as the beneficiary (MH Pb(t4)¬b).
Once again, however, Mary's response to Mike's offer, u5 at t5 in line 10, makes
available the inference that Mike's response is still somehow inapposite (i.e.MPPb(t5)¬c).
While she initially responds in a way that appears as if she is going to straightforwardly
accept the offer (`um yea-'), her confirming response is cut-off and redone with an
account (`well it's less messier actually'). Through this account Mary makes available
the inference that eating off plates would be better, and thus that she is making a request
with both Mary and Mike as beneficiaries (MPPb(t5)d). Mike indicates his understanding
of Mary's overall communicative intention through both his verbal response (`okay' in
line 11, u6 at t6) and non-verbal actions (i.e. getting a plate for both of them while Mary
instructs him on where the plates are kept in lines 12-14), thereby making available his
final inference vis-à-vis u1, and the one they both settle on, MH Pb(t6)d.
To summarise, the conversational inferences that underpin the interactional achieve-
ment of this `speaker meaning' can be represented as follows:
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MPPv(t0)
MPPb(t1)a∧b∧c∧d MH Pv(t1)
MPPv(t2) MH Pb(t2)a
MPPb(t3)¬a∧b∧c∧d MH Pv(t3)
MPPv(t4) MH Pb(t4)¬b∧c
MPPb(t5)d MH Pv(t5)
MPPv(t6) MH Pb(t6)d
u1: there's one in the cupboard if you want one
u2: should be okay
u3: you alright?
u4: do you want one?
u5: it's less messier
u6: okay
Note that the exact relationship between the public inference that Mary makes available
at t5 (i.e. MPPb(t5)d) which they ultimately settle upon at t6 (i.e. MH Pb(t6)d), and the
one that Mary initially makes available (MPPb(t1)a∧b∧c∧d) at t1 is clearly open to dispute
by these two conversational participants. It is possible that Mike did respond in the way
that Mary consciously intended, namely as an offer of a plate, but something about the
situation of discourse (e.g. that Mike was making a lot of mess when eating the biscuits)
prompted Mary to respond in such a way so as to indicate something was wrong, and so
she formed a post hoc intention to get Mike to eat the biscuits from a plate. However,
it is also possible that Mary did intend Mike to get plates for them both all along, and
that the negotiation of settling on the speaker meaning of u1 was all in service of that
initial intention.
What we can say with certainty is that we cannot say with any certainty that the
final meaning that is settled on as the `speaker meaning' is the one that Mary intended
at t0; instead, it is more empirically sound to suggest that since Mike responded in
a particular way, Mary decided to continue the discourse in accordance with Mike's
response. In this sense, we cannot attribute an a priori intention to Mary at t0, as
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intentions can change over time, and hence may be ascribed to utterances in different
ways at different times. Presuming a particular intention of Mary at t0, and deciding
whether Mike got it `right' (or not), is therefore not a cognitively or empirically accurate
way to analyse her utterance meaning, exactly because through making responses to
her prior talk, Mike influences the inferences that Mary subsequently makes available,
and vice versa. It is for this reason that Haugh (2017b) proposes that `prompting' is a
more appropriate term for this kind of phenomenon, as to treat it as `hinting' presumes
a definitive, a priori intention on the part of Mary at t0.
14 However, while Mary could
retrospectively be taken by Mike as intentionally hinting at t1, he (and thus we) can
never be sure. What we can say for sure is that whatever her intentions might have
been, the `speaker meaning' that the two participants make operative is the one that
they ultimately interactionally achieve over a series of interlinked turns of talk. So,
then, in terms of propositional meaning, it doesn't really matter what Mary intended,
but rather that at t3 she makes it clear whether Mike displayed an inference that was
compatible with what she plausibly could have intended (Elder forthcoming; Sanders
2015).
What should be clear from this interlinked set of representations is that these in-
ferences are formally interdependent. That is, the public inference that Mary settles
on (MPPb(t5)c) is made available in response to the prior inference made available by
Mike (MH Pb(t4)b), which is made available, in turn, in response to the prior inference
made available by Mary (MPPb(t3)¬a), which is made available in response to the prior
inference made available by Mike (MH Pb(t2)a), which is made available, in turn, in re-
sponse to the inference initially made available by Mary (MPPb(t1)a∧b∧c∧d) at time t1.
In other words, the latter inferences recursively embed sequentially prior ones, and so
are formally interdependent with them. It is the formal interdependence of this under-
lying three-part architecture of conversational inference that confers the property of
non-summativity on the interactional achievement of `speaker meaning'.
4.3 Indeterminate meanings
The focus on adjacent turns of talk in our analysis thus far may give rise to the impres-
sion that we are privileging the local sequential context over the influence of broader
contextual considerations in developing a formal model of `speaker meaning' as interac-
tional achievement. However, while conversational participants may very often settle on
what a speaker is taken to mean by an utterance u at time t through adjacent turns of
talk, this is not always the case, as the three-part architecture of conversational infer-
ence may well be dispersed across a number of non-adjacent turns. More importantly,
14Conversational participants may well attempt, of course, to hold a speaker accountable for having
such `intentions'.
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perhaps, what a speaker is taken to mean by an utterance u at time t may well be
influenced by utterances that have occurred well before the one in question (u−m at
time t−m) or well after it (un at time tn) (Haugh 2012). Indeed, even when participants
converge through the three-part architecture of conversational inference on a particular
`meaning' with respect to a particular utterance that is initially indeterminate as to
what exactly is meant by that speaker, there may nevertheless remain some degree of
indeterminacy for those participants with respect to what the speaker is taken to have
meant.
To illustrate what we mean by this claim, consider the following example.
(5) (Emma and Chris are talking about how acupuncture draws on the notion of
chi)
1 E: and the needles happen to be one of the most effective
2 ways to manipulate it
3 C: yeah?
4 E: mmmm
5 C: can you fix patellar tendonitis? ◦heh◦
6 (1.7)
7 E: ↑maybe ↑yeah
8 C: yeah?
9 (0.3)
10 E: have you got that?
11 C: I have yeah
(Haugh 2008b: 63)15
What is meant by Chris's utterance u1 in line 5, `can you fix patellar tendonitis?', ap-
pears at first glance to be genuinely indeterminate. Some of the possible inferences that
he makes available include:
CPb(t1)a: I want to know if you can fix patellar tendonitis
CPb(t1)b: I want to know if you can fix my patellar tendonitis
CPb(t1)c: I want you to fix my patellar tendonitis
CPb(t1)d: I doubt you can fix patellar tendonitis
15Once again, the original transcription has been simplified apart from representing softly delivered
speech, indicated through degree symbols, and pauses, indicated through reporting the length of silence
between utterances measured to the nearest tenth of a second in brackets. See Haugh (2015: 219-224)
for a more detailed transcription and analysis of this example.
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While the first three possible inferences made available through Chris's utterance u1
at time t1 are clearly interlinked, the fourth introduces a playful, non-serious frame,
and (normatively) requires a very different sort of response to that expected to the
former three. This indeterminacy as to what Chris means by his question is partly a
function of the way in which his question appears to come somewhat out of the blue, as
previously Emma has been talking in only very general terms about how acupuncture
works. Indeed, Emma only responds after a considerable pause (line 6). It is also a
consequence of the way in which a (soft) pulse of laughter is appended to his question in
turn-final position. Turn-final laughter can invite laughter (Jefferson 1979), which would
frame Chris's question as a teasing challenge. Laughter can also orient to the action
delivered through that turn as potentially disaffiliative or offensive (Clift 2012), in this
case, raising the possibility that fixing this particular medical condition lies beyond
what can be achieved through acupuncture. After a pause, however, Emma orients to
Chris's question as potentially pre-request implicative, that is, as likely projecting a
forthcoming request for treatment by Chris for that condition, and the conversation
proceeds on those grounds.
Note, however, that Emma responds to Chris's question in such a way as to avoid
being committed to an interpretation of it as a pre-request. By only first responding
with `maybe, yeah' in line 7, Emma makes available the inference that she has under-
stood Chris as asking whether she is able to treat patellar tendonitis (EPb(t2)a). She
thereby withholds a pre-emptive offer that would make available the inference that she
has understood Chris as implying that he would like her assistance to treat patellar
tendonitis (his or someone else's for whom he is asking). Chris then responds in a way
in line 8 that makes available and thus confirms the former inference (i.e. CPb(t3)a) but
remains indeterminate with respect to the latter two inferences (i.e. CPb(t1)b or CPb(t1)c).
Emma's subsequent question (`have you got that?') then makes available this second
inference (EPb(t4)b), an inference that Chris subsequently confirms (`I have yeah'). In
that way, then, Emma treats Chris's question as only potentially pre-request implica-
tive, but not necessarily so. Indeed, it is only many turns later that Chris finally asks
for Emma's card, thereby confirming this inference (see Haugh 2012: 181-182).
(6) (Emma and Chris have been discussing Chris's condition for over a minute)
1 E: I don't know if I could get a lasting result
2 I don't know if I could cure it but I could
3 [certainly] probably improve it
4 C: [yeah ]
5 C: yeah, your card [or ah]
6 E: [yeah I'll] give ya a card
7 C: yeah
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8 E: I'm give ya a card [now]
9 C: [will ]ing to give anything a go
(Haugh 2012: 181)
The initial three-part model can thus be extended m-turns preceding or, in this case,
n-turns following the utterance that serves as the anchor for the focal `speaker meaning'
in question.
APv(t0)
APb(t1) BPv(t1)
APv(t2) BPb(t2)
APb(t3) · · ·
APv(tn) BPb(tn)
· · ·
u1: can you fix patellar tendonitis?
u2: maybe, yeah
u3: yeah?
un: yeah, your card
In sum, despite initial indeterminacy as to what is meant by Chris's question in line
5, Emma and Chris nevertheless move towards interactionally achieving over time an
operative understanding of Chris's `speaker meaning' here as implicating a forthcoming
request for a medical consultation about that condition. Just as we saw in the case of the
negotiation of what Mary initially meant in the previous example, initial indeterminacy
with respect to `speaker meaning' can be resolved through the three-part architecture
of conversational inference ratcheting down as the conversation progresses.
There therefore appear to be formal grounds for the claim by interactional linguists
that
meaning lies not with the speaker nor the addressee nor the utterance
alone as many philosophical arguments have considered, but rather with
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the interactional past, current, and projected next moment. The meaning
of an entire utterance is a complex, not well understood, algorithm of these
emergent, non-linear, sense-making interactions (Schegloff et al. 1996: 181).
We have attempted here to formally model the conversational inferences that underpin
this algorithm, and in so doing, would submit that complex, such emergent, non-linear
inferential processes are nevertheless tractableas indeed they must ultimately be given
we do evidently understand each other sufficiently for us to manage the current con-
versational purposes at hand (at least most of the time).
It is important to note though that whatever `speaker meaning' is ultimately in-
teractionally achieved by the participants through that three-part architecture, other
inferences that are initially made available by that utterance are not necessarily elimi-
nated (Haugh 2017a). Whether Emma also took Chris's question as a teasing challenge
remains off-record but nevertheless inferable, given the specific design and sequential
placement of his question, and the scepticism about acupuncture that Chris had pre-
viously expressed in that conversation (see Haugh 2012: 182-184). While off-record
inferences of the latter sort may well arise, they are by their very nature generally
left off-record by conversational participants. It is for that reason that we are limiting,
for the moment at least, our account of `speaker meaning' to primary propositional
meanings that are made operative between interlocutors.
5 Conclusion
A key question for any theory of meaning concerns the kind of meaning that is to be
represented, whether that is explicit meanings pertaining to uttered sentence forms, or
whether it is the most salient meanings that are (sometimes implicitly) communicated
by interlocutors. Our aim has been to represent the meanings that interlocutors jointly
and manifestly make use of in interaction, and hence to develop a model of speaker
meaning that formalises non-summative aspects of speaker meaning that can output
determinate propositional forms. While our account gives credence to the idea that an
implicitly communicated implicature is sometimes the most salient meaning that is un-
derstood by interlocutors, it also shows that the main intended meaning of the speaker
may not be the one that is picked up on. Rather, our account provides a fine-grained ac-
count of the formal interdependence of the conversational inferencing that interlocutors
engage in when mutually operationalising meanings for current purposes. Our account
therefore enables us to identify when and where mismatches in understandings between
speakers occur, but also to track the resolution of understandings that may lead to
meanings that weren't `intended' at the time of utterance.
One of the key aims of this paper has thus been to extend the one- or two-turn
accounts of speaker meaning that are prevalent in the extant literature to consider
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the  sometimes crucial  third turn that influences the uptake of meaning. Of course,
prototypically, speakers do not have problems working out inferences of utterances in
real time. It would be costly and arduous for speakers to continually confirm in the
third turn that they have been understood satisfactorily, and speakers generally opt
instead to simply continue the discourse. In that sense, the three-turn process can
be  and is very often  short-circuited, as two turns is enough to mutually presume
understanding. However, we have to understand that the one- or two-turn summative
inferential process is a short-circuiting of a more complex non-summative process, by
which non-summative inferences emerge through the three-part architecture that we
have modelled here. But it is exactly because the formally non-summative inferences
consist of interdependently linked chains of summative inferences, that the process can
be straightforwardly short-circuited by conversational participants.
There are nevertheless aspects of speaker meaning that we have not addressed in
this model. Speaker meaning itself is a heterogenous class (Sperber & Wilson 2015) of
which primary propositional meanings are just one type, and (as Relevance Theorists
have long argued) a range of weak implicatures may also arise in communicative interac-
tion. We suggest that the latter types of `secondary meanings' are inevitably premised
on summative conversational inferences, which, on the formal grounds we have out-
lined here, cannot be `confirmed' by participants in the way that primary propositional
meanings can. Moreover, side participants or over-hearers to conversation are totally
reliant on a short-circuited two-stage process as they do not provide contributions by
which they can make available their inferences with respect to what is being said, and
so their understandings of speaker meanings are formally summative.
So while tracing the inferences that conversational participants make available through
their responses to (just) prior turns of talk offers analysts a very useful tool for tracing
the emergence of speaker meanings in discourse, it does not eliminate the need for other
kinds of methods that allow us to tap into the private inferences that conversational
participants evidently make. Our model is thus not intended to override extant accounts
of meaning, and we have deliberately remained agnostic about the specifics of cognitive
processing to be filled by other theories of utterance processing. Rather, our point has
been that while it is possible to go from a three-part account of conversational inference
(as we have proposed here) to theorising about a one- or two-stage process, the reverse
is not formally possible: speaker meanings that arise through the three-part architec-
ture of conversational inferencing cannot be reduced without remainder to those arising
through one or two parts.
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